Conall

In respect of the quote which version of the Sopwith Triplane was was Collishaw talking about? The early production models (very limited numbers) with the Clerget 9Z nine cylinder rotary engine only produced 110hp (82kw) as opposed to the more usual model with the Clerget 9B engine, which produced 130hp (97kw) albeit being about 40kg heavier. This may have been one of the early models which may have been slower. More generally the Sopwith Triplane was reported as slower in a dive (and probably straight line acceleration) than the Albatros III, which was because of the increased drag induced by the triplane design. So again Collishaw may have meant acceleration rather than top speed, which for fighter pilots dependent on surprise and speed of response was an important consideration. Or he could have had a duff engine (anyone familiar with classic British motorbikes will well know the difference between a 'Monday' model and a 'Friday' production model..) or he could just have been talking bollocks. Who knows? Tom

Decal order arrived yesterday. Now prepping the first of my 19 Sqn RFC SPAD VII repaints. Very many thanks! Tom

Order placed & PM sent. Many thanks. Tom

Yes please! Do you have the Squadron markings (barbells etc.) in black as well as white? Thanks. Tom

Ditto. Would have voted for a SPAD VII in honour of my grandfather & 19 Sqn RFC but failing that the SE5a gets my vote: fast, tough & manoeuvrable but sufficiently thought-provoking because of the steep manoeuvres. Having said that if you're not using altitude rules then the Camel is always an absolute blast, not least because once you merge you're pretty committed (& even more so with the Dr.1)! Tom

From the war diary of 19 Squadron RFC 15th September 1916 During the night machines were sent with orders to drop bombs on the enemy billets, his railway junctions, aerodromes or any good target that could be found, and this was done from every aerodrome in the Somme area. At 4.50am two machines left to attack Havrincourt Chateau. Four 112lb bombs were dropped from 1,200 feet. Captain G.W.D Allen reports that one of his bombs exploded in the south-west corner of the Chateu, knocking out one of the walls. Second Lieutenant Edwards did not observe the bursts of his bombs. The Opening Day of the Third Phase of the Battle of the Somme (15th September 1916) This day was marked by the first operational appearance of the tank. From the start of the attack, specially selected pilots of the squadron were allotted the task of flying a continuous and very low contact patrol over the trenches in order to report every movement of our advance, and, in particular, the position of the tanks. The system of contact patrols (close communication between aircraft and infantry, cavalry, tanks etc.) was now recognised as a tactical achievement and played its part accordingly in the Battle of the Somme. From this date the Squadron continued with its offensive fighter patrols and bombing raids as well as the special contact patrols. Officers and men were compelled to fly and work day and night, repairing the damage causes by AA and machine gun fire in order to keep pace with the great offensive. Captain Henderson was the first to go up on the special contact patrol. Before he returned Second Lieutenant Selous was sent to maintain the contact with the troops. He in his turn was succeeded by Lieutenant G.B.A. Baker, and so on. Captain Henderson, his machine riddled with bullets, reported seeing our troops leave the trenches and go ahead. Only a few, he said, were held up. On his second patrol, he reported seeing on the tanks capture a village at the head of a column of men walking beside it, cheering and waving to him as he flew over.

From 19 Squadron RFC's war diary: Towards the middle of September there were rumours of a final and very determined effort on a large scale to break the Hun line before the winter. It was whispered that entirely new forms of frightfulness were to be employed, but so little was known, and the orders for secrecy so imperative, that they could only be described as 'hush hush' machines. Interest was further aroused when it was known that aeroplanes were to work in close co-operation with these mysterious engines of war. On the 13th September the Squadron Commander was informed the date of the new attack was fixed for the 15th, and that a very special task was to be carried out by No 19 for which he was to select his most skilful pilots. This was no less than a continuous and very close patrol low over the trenches from the time the attack started, in order to report direct every movement of our advance, and, particularly, the position of the Tanks, as the 'hush hush' machines were now called. On the afternoon of the 14th all the officers of the three squadrons [of 9 HQ Wing] were collected together and were addressed by Major-General Trenchard himself. In grave tones he explained the great effort that was to be made the next morning and how it was dependent for its success on the help of the Corps. He called upon every pilot to do his utmost, and if need be to sacrifice himself loyally in the common cause. This address made a deep impression on the officers of the squadron. Tom

It's not a criticism (implied or otherwise) &, as I've said before, I think you do a fantastic job especially given the constraints of time & material. My intention was to add to your already comprehensive report. I only have additional information because of personal reasons (my grandfather was CO of 19 Squadron at the time) - I couldn't emulate the same level of detail, as you consistently do, with the same degree of fidelity or detail. So hats off to you And from a historian's perspective it shows just how difficult it is in compiling comprehensive accounts from the sources available, especially when official sources like the RAF roll of honour contain significant lacunae or inaccuracies. Tom

Interesting that there is a discrepancy and the RAF roll of honour shows the KIA for Sunday 27 August. I wonder if this is because the operation was relatively late in the day on Saturday 26 August 1916 or if it reflects a delay in getting the information to HQ (unlikely as I think 9 Wing, of which 19 Squadron were part along with 27 Squadron and 70 Squadron were co-located with the advanced RFC HQ - so much so that 9 Wing, commanded by Lt-Col Dowding, was known as HQ Wing). Lieutenant William Chance (later Sir William Chance CBE), flying Martinsyde 'Elephants' with 27 Squadron, comments in his memoirs that: "Shortly after my arrival the H.Q. Wing was reinforced with a Squadron of B.E.12s (No. 19) - single seaters engined by a 12 cylinder, 140 horsepower R.A.F. We saw little of them as their hangars were on the opposite side of the aerodrome. The planes were out-dated before they arrived and were no match for the German Albatros DII with its twin Spandau machine guns firing through the propeller and manned by the pilots of Boelke's newly formed Jadgstaffel 2. In a westerly gale on August 26th the Squadron had great difficulty in getting home from a raid on Havrincourt Wood, and five of its planes were lost." Tom

Addendum - 26 August 1916 26 August 1916 was a disastrous day for 19 Squadron RFC operating from Flienvillers losing five aircraft with two pilots killed, a third who died later of his wounds and two taken as prisoners of war. From the squadron’s war diary: “At 5.18pm on a bombing raid on Bois de Havrincourt, Captain Williams dropped his bombs on target and was attacked by hostile aircraft twice on his way back but was unable to return the fire. He landed at 34 aerodrome because of rainstorm [elsewhere described as a violent thunderstorm]. Second Lieutenant Johnson’s bombs failed to release. His engine oiled up, and he force-landed in a field nearby. He was lost on other side of the lines for about one hour, fired at with fire balls, and his machine was shot through planes, main and tail, and longerons. His compass was out of adjustment which caused him to lose his way. Captain Henderson saw explosions in Holnon Wood, west of St Quentin. Eleven BE12s took part in this bombing raid, five machines failed to return: Lieutenant S.P. Briggs (6562) – missing [POW] Second Lieutenant R. Talbot (6513) – missing [KIA] Lieutenant H.M. Corbold (6551) – missing [died of wounds in hospital] Second Lieutenant A.W. Reynall (6532) – missing [POW] Lieutenant E. Callaghan (6545) – missing [KIA]" After the war one of the captured pilots on return from his imprisonment in Germany explained that as the leading machines of the formation entered the first thunder clouds, a large formation of enemy aircraft appeared out of the haze and the severed the rear machines from the rest of the formation. Compelled to fight an unequal contest, all five machines were driven down in combat. From a magazine article written by Peter G. Cooksley, titled The Captive Among the pilots of No 19 Squadron based at Fienvillers at this time, attached to ‘C’ Flight was a youthful Second Lieutenant Briggs, formerly of the Northamptonshire Regiment who, on 26 August found himself part of a formation detailed to bomb German troop billets near Mons. Only two bombs could be carried by each aircraft, one of 20lb being slung under each wing. These bombs were aimed by means of the Central Flying School bombsight, training in the use of which had been given on the aerodrome with the aid of a camera obscura. Defensive armament of these Bes consisted of a forward-firing synchronised Vickers gun, while a Lewis was free-mounted on the fuselage aft of the pilot’s seat. Poor weather meant that ‘C’ Flight was kept standing for several hours. It did not finally take off until late in the afternoon, although the subsequent journey to the target was uneventful except for some poorly-aimed anti-aircraft fire. However, a large formation of German interceptors were spotted which made no attempt to molest the British machines. Having dropped their bombs from 700 feet, the flight re-formed and set course back to base only to run immediately into a heavy rainstorm with thunder and lightning. As the aircraft made their way through this, Lieutenant Briggs lost contact with his fellows and was destined not to see them again. It was 2300 when his BE12 ran out of fuel and a forced landing had to be made almost at once. Fortunately this aircraft had a shallow gliding angle so getting down was not particularly hazardous, although the pilot had an uneasy moment when a tall chimney loomed out of the murk, causing him to take sharp evasive action. The light-coloured patch on the ground at which Briggs had been aiming, turned out to be a field from which the corn had recently been harvested so the machine rolled to a halt across the stubble without mishap. Uppermost in the young Lieutenant’s mind was the fact that, although he no idea of his exact position, he had landed on the enemy side of the lines. [The article goes on to describe his capture, interrogation and captivity.] Hope this is of interest. Tom

I just wanted to reiterate everyone else's thanks. These summaries are absolutely amazing and the level of detail is quite phenomenal. Thank you so much and keep up the good work! Tom

Almost certainly piloted by 2nd Lt C. Green (6549) taken prisoner of war on 13 August 1916, when he was reported missing. 19 Squadron RFC's war diary reads as follows: "The Squadron patrol of four BE12s attacked four hostile aircraft over Bapaume, dispersing them. The BE12s were in turn attacked from above by two other hostile aircraft, one of which was seen to side slip after a short encounter, and was lost sight of. Lieutenant Green is believed to have been forced to land from engine failure [very likely as the engine of the BE12c was notoriously unreliable], but no-one saw him go down." And the following was written by his flight commander, Captain Cecil Tidswell (KIA 16 October 1916 - possibly a victim of Manfred von Richthofen) in a letter home to Tidswell's parents: “We had quite stirring times again on Sunday. We went on an offensive patrol after tea and got properly strafed over Bapaume. “I had gone over there to drop some letters and was wondering why we were being ‘Archied’ at all, the reason being that there were a lot of their own machines up which came for us. “I first saw one of ours having a scrap down below me and was diving down to lend a hand when I heard a machine gun quite close to me. For some time I couldn’t quite make out where he was, and then suddenly spotted a biplane about 200 yards off to my right, with the observer having a nice pot shot at me. “As soon as I turned towards them they went off with me in hot pursuit. I had him well in the sights of my gun and got about fifty rounds in before he disappeared under my machine. I don’t think they fired a shot at me once I went for them, so I hope that I have done in the observer... My engine again showed signs of giving out so I went quickest and best for the lines, and, after waiting around for the others a bit, came home. When I landed I found one carburettor had been smashed by a bullet, so the engine did rather well to get me home; there was also a bullet through the back of my seat, which had torn a big hole in the cushion I have in the small of my back, and another one in the one I was sitting on. “Of the other three machines two got knocked about by ‘Archie’ and are still under repair, and another has not returned. He was one of the nicest men in my flight, but I think he must be alright as the German wireless said ‘A British machine was forced to land east of Bapaume’. So I hope that it was only his engine that was knocked out.” Tom